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PROPER FUNCTION, RELIABILITY AND WARRANT 




Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function 
constitute Alvin Plantinga's recent effort to refute contemporary 
theories of warrant and to establish his own.1The assault against the 
current theories in Warrant: The Current Debate is undertaken by 
using bizarre counterexamples such as the Case of the Epistemicall y 
Serendipitous Brain Lesion or of the Epistemically Inflexible C limbe l', 
as well as forays into Alpha-Centaurian worlds which include 
Cartesian demons turned Star Trek and middle-aged radioactive 
invisible elephants. The majority of these creative counterexamples 
are produced to show that the standard accounts of warrant fail 
because they wither when confronted with abnormalities and mal­
functioning cognitive faculties. While I am not in complete agree­
ment with Plantinga's consequent theory in Warrant and Proper 
Function, I do think that both his attack on the other theories of 
warrant and his own formulation are very illuminating and might 
pl'Ovide some useful insights into the nature of warrant. By discuss­
ing what I take to be the shortcomings of his proper function the~)I'Y' 
I hope to show the general direction in which we might find a fail' 
initial approximation of warrant. The resulting theory wi 11 be large Iy 
descriptive, rather than normative, but it is difficult to keep a strict 
distinction between the two in these matters. 
Plantinga's positive theory is laid out in Warrant and Proper 
Function: 
a belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been 
produced in me by cognitive faculties that are work­
ing properly (functioning as they ought to, subject to 
no cognitive dysfunction) in a cognitive environment 
that is appropriate for my kinds of cognitive faculties, 
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Illdialla, Jw will be attending The University ofAdzOllfl il1 tlte fall wit/I tlw illtel/Moll of 
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F,11i.'lteme • Volum V. a11 1 
74 JACK C. LYONS 
(2) the segment of the design plan governing the 
production of the belief is aimed at the productionof 
true beliefs, and (3) there is a high statistical probabil­
ity that a belief produced under those conditions will 
be true (WPF, II, II, p. 58). 
Although the above cited formulation of warrant states that I am 
warranted "only if" (1), (2) and (3), I think that the rest of the book 
makes itdear that he intends these criteria to benotonly individually 
necessary, but also jointly sufficient (or very nearly so) for warrant. 
I do not think, however, that they are either individually neces­
sarynorvery near I yjointl y sufficientfor warrant. Criterion (3) nearly 
makes the first two seem superfluous, for as long as there is a high 
probability that the belief-producing mechanism functioning under 
a certain set of circumstances yields true beliefs, what difference 
could itmake whether they are in the right environment, or that they 
are properly designed or properly functioning, or that they are 
designedwith the intention of producing true beliefs? Provided that 
we grant (3), what need is there for us to struggle with (1) and (2)? 
This, I think, is the question that must be addressed. 
Ifwe consider Plantinga's Case of the Epistemically Serendipi­
tous Lesion, it seems that a minor alteration will show that proper 
function does not contribute to warrant in the manner that he has 
suggested. In this instance, a person has a brain lesion tha tmakes hel' 
believe all sorts of ridiculous things,and one of those beliefs is that 
she has a brain lesion. Surely she does not know that she is suffering 
from a brain lesion, even though it is true. Thus, she is not warranted 
inbelieving it (WeD. IX, II, B, p. 256, ff.). This case is invoked to show 
that a causal type of reliabilism (such that I amwarranted in the belief 
that s is F iff s's being F causes or sustains that belief) is false.* 
However, we need onlychange this to the Case of the God-Given 
Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion to show that pl'oper function is 
also false. In this case, however, the brain lesion does not produce a 
large number of beliefs; it only produces one, that the pel'son has a 
brain lesion. Further, if we stipulate that God gives someone that 
lesion so thatshe would truly believe that she has a brain lesion, then 
.. Throughout this paper the term "iff"will be used to designate "ifand only if" 
in logical propositions. -ed. 
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Plantinga must concede that she has knowledge, even though it is 
clear to the rest of us that she does not. None of her other faculties are 
disrupted by the lesion; it adds to her cognitive apparatus without 
taking anything away. God. working in mysterious ways ashe does, 
designs a brain lesion that will always produce this one true belief. 
This is the purpose of the lesion, and God creates a faculty. rather 
than a deformity. 
Since this new lesion-sensing faculty wasdevised and implanted 
by God, it is clear that (1) the belief in question is the result of a 
properly functioning faculty in an appropriate environment (God 
took environment into consideration when devising the leSion), (2) 
the relevant segment of the design plan is aimed at true belief and (3) 
the design is a good one (the belief it produces is always true). This 
case fits perfectly with Plantinga's notion of warrant, yet surely this 
person is not really warranted in believing that she has a brain 
lesion.2 What relevant difference would it make if the lesion were 
produced by God and not by some injury? 
A similar example can be borrowed from an old episode of The 
Twilight Zone. In this episode, a man tosses a coin and it lands on its 
edge. For the rest of the day he is able to read people's minds. By the 
end of the day itwould seem as ifhe might have some warrant for the 
beliefs produced by this new and amazing faculty. since he would 
have the opportunity to check what he "hears" with other sources, 
conferring with people he could trust, and so forth. An important 
point to note, however, is that whether we decide that his beliefs are 
warranted or not, we do so before discovering whether his new 
faculty is a gift from God or the result of some freak accident. 
We can modify this scenario a bit and suppose that God gives our 
coin-tosser his mind-reading faculty. but that this faculty works 
only once every six hours and 42 minutes. Two or three times a day 
our friend hears a voice in his head which seems to be coming from 
someone else's head and he believes that he is hearing someone 
2 Even if the lesion also produces a vast number of ridiculously false beliefs (as 
in Plantinga's original case), this counterexample should still hold, for Planting" 
stipulates that only the relevant segment must be aimed at the production of true 
beliefs. If the lesion's recipient ill/ers tha t she has a brain disorder because she notices 
that she suddenly has a large number of ridiculous beliefs, then we are suddenly 
dealing with a different cognitive means (inference rather than the lesion). For 
Plantinga's theory to hold, she must be warranted prior to inference, since proper 
function etc. is supposed to be sufficient for warrant. 
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else's thoughts. However, the faculty works only for the duration of 
a single thought. and he is not around anyone with whom he can 
speak in order to test the verity of his new faculty. Once again, God 
has designed a splendid, truth-yielding, cognitive faculty, even if it 
is not always at the disposal of the subject>swill (Plantinga does not 
claim that it must be); the faculty does exactly what God intended it 
to do, in the environment for which God intended it. 
Six hours and 42 minutes after tossing that fated coin, our 
protagonist accidentally bumpsinto a scowling old biker and"hears" 
his first thought: "Watch where you're going, you silly and brutish 
oaf." But our friend certainly does not know that "silly and brutish 
oaf" was the precise appellation that the biker had formulated inhis 
mind; surely he is not warranted inbelieving that. (In fact, given the 
subject's past experience with scowling old bikers, he is probably 
warranted in believing that "silly and brutish oaf" was not the 
appellation used in this particular case). 
As time progresses. our friend may learn that these voices come 
to him exactly every six hours and 42 minutes, and he may sit down 
and test this faculty with his wife or a friend, thereby learning that it 
does in fact yield true beliefs. Itwould seem tha t at this point (and not 
until this point) our protagonist may be warranted in his beliefs. But 
ifwestipulate that this faculty is the result of some freak accident and 
not the work of God or evolution, then we are forced to choose 
between our coin-tosser's warrant and Plantinga's theory, for 
Plantinga would have to hold that the man's beliefs are not war­
ranted, since proper function, etc. is a necessary condition for war­
rant. Until our friend has somehow ascertained the reliability of his 
new faculty, it would seem that he is not even nearly warranted. 
Whether he is a fortunate recipient of a divine gift or a hapless 
individual who just stepped into the Twilight Zone, the beliefs 
produced by this brand-new faculty simply are not warranted. 
Examples like this can be easily multiplied. We can imagine any 
number of adventitious faculties that simply defy explanation. In 
every case, I think. we will say that the recipient is not (at least not 
immediately) warranted inbelieving wha t these faculties induce her 
to believe, no matter where they have come from. The mere fact that 
they are new and bizarre implies that they are not to be trusted prior 
to investigation. 
What I think these thought experiments show is not only that 
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there is something wrong with proper function theory but also just 
what is missing from simple reliabilism. What hinders warrant in 
these cases, the God-Given Lesion and the Part-Time Mind Reader, 
is that although the cognitive apparatus is completely reliable and 
functioning in a proper environment, the cognizer has little or no 
reason to believe that it is. Reliability is an extremely important 
aspect of warrant, but not just any reliability will sulfice, it must be 
reliability that is recognized as such btJ the cognizer. 
This seems to invite immediate problems. but it need not. Reli­
ability as I conceive it is an objective, external property of a cognitive 
faculty or process. I think that Plantinga is right in thinking that an 
externalist account of warrant is more promising than an internalist 
one. I may be doing my very best to believe all and only propositions 
that are true, but if I am suffering from some type of cognitive 
malfunction I will not be warranted in many of these otherwise 
responsibly formed beliefs. However, as my intended 
counterexamples to proper function theory show, this alone is not 
sufficient. The cognizer must also have some reason to believe­
some assurance-that this faculty or process is, in fact, reliable. 
Before I try to explain how this might be had, though, I should 
like to set out a perfunctory explanation of what a faculty or a process 
is, as this has caused some problems in the past. First of all, I would 
like to lump them together under the title "cognitive means." (The 
way in which I use this term should obviate any objections; for the 
present purposes, the difference between a faculty and a process will 
not be significant). A cognitive means is anything that will suffice as 
a reasonable answer to the question, "How do you know that?" There 
will be unreasonable answers like, "A little bird told me," but these 
should be fairly easy to weed out without a great deal of controversy. 
Reasonable answers would include such responses as, HI remember 
it," or "I saw it," or "I multip lied the numerator and the denominator 
of the second fraction by two and added the numerators of both 
fractions," or "I read it in the newspaper." Perhaps we could even say, 
"Every six hours and 42 minutes I have the ability to read minds for 
the duration of a single thought, and I 'heard' you think that." Inany 
case, the mere fact that we use the label "cognitive means" does not 
entail that we automatically assume reliability. 
Simply answering the above question will not always give us a 
clear-cut delineation of cognitive means, but it is not obvious that a 
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clear-cut delineation is always necessary. We can and should, how­
ever, make more precise distinctions where there is a difference in 
reliability between different species of the same generic means. 
For example. we might initiallywant to viewmemorysimpliciter 
as a cognitive means, until we have some assurance of differences in 
reliability between different kinds of memorial functions. I might 
have some strange memorial disorder which prevents me from 
remembering things that happenonMondays. In this event, the rest 
ofrnymemorialcognitive meansmightbe reliable, althoughwhen it 
comes to things occurring on Mondays, I cannot be warranted in 
believing that I remember them. By way of comparing reliability we 
come to distinguish different cognitive means. Thus the distinctions 
can and should vary from person to person, as far as concerns the 
individual's assessment of her own equipment. All instances of 
seeing are not the same for a person withpoor night vision. For this 
reasonitisneithernecessarynordesirablethatwealwaysmakethese 
distinctions clear--cut.3 
Having touched on this, I think I can explain my conception of 
warrant in slightly more concise terms: 
5 is warranted in believing p iff (1) the cognitive 
means (c) that produces or sustains 5's belief in pis 
reliable, and (2) 5 has some proper assurance that c is 
reliable. 
As my objections to Plantinga are intended to show, mere reliability 
(or as Plantinga calls it, "a high statistical probability that a belief 
produced under those conditions will be true"), whether produced 
byGod ornot, is not enough. The cognizer must also havewhat I call 
proper assurance that the relevant cognitive means is reliable. 
Ifproper assurance were merely warrant under a different name 
3 Although perhaps not always clear-cut, the distinctions will have to be very 
narrow when it comes to Gettier cases, my response to which will be to suggest Ulat 
certain very particular cognitive means in very particular circumstances are not 
reliable. I think I can do this because I have included within the designation 
"cognitive means" both faculties and processes. In normal circumstances the 
inferences made may becompletely reliable, but in these rare situations they are not 
Gustasvision is not reliable under certain lighting conditions); even though wemay 
be warranted in thinking that the inference is reliable, it might be the case that the 
inference itself is not reliable and that it is therefore not warranted. 
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it would be very difficult for us to know anything, for this would 
yield an infinite regress. Instead, I mean to include something like a 
particular, weaker form of justification which applies only to beliefs 
concerning the reliability of cognitive means. This should become 
more clear as I continue. 
In the above examples, I indicated that the adventitious faculties 
did not produce warrant but that they could and often would if the 
agent were given enough time to test their reliability. How we 
determine this reliability can be seen by observing how we do this 
with the faculties we already possess, how we come to some feeling 
of assurance concerning our normal faculties. This seems to be 
accomplished through coherence. 
The type of coherence I have in mind here is very similar to that 
which David Burne invokes to explain the origin of our ideas of an 
external reality. Burne's theory is that we come to believe in the 
endurance of objects beyond our immediate perception, because to 
do otherwise would fly in the face of our experience. Whenwe sitand 
watch objects, we conSistently find thatthey do not simply disappear 
and reappear. 
[My] observations are contrary, unless I suppose that 
the door still remains, and that it was open'd without 
my perceiving it: And this supposition, which was at 
first entirely arbitl'my and hypothetical, acquires a 
new fOl'ce and evidence by its being the only one, 
upon which I can reconcile these contradictions 
(Hurne, p. 196-7). 
I think that Hume is right inbelieving that the only evidence we can 
find for the reliability of our senses is some degl'ee of coherence. 4 We 
cannot directly perceive objects without the interposition of our 
faculties, and so we cannot simply compare the sense impressions to 
the things themselves. 
A foundationalist might want to claim that the evidence of our 
4 I do not want to draw Hume as <1 coherentist, although I think that his 
contribution here to coherentism is often neglected. Hume certainly does not think 
that this argument entailed a proof that we have sensory knowledge (in his senses 
of the terms, "proof" and "know ledge"). He does, however, seem to think tha t this 
comprises a justification in some broadly deontological sense. 
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senses is properly basic, but I hardly think any philosopher would 
believe that the cognitive productions of my intermittent mind­
reading capacity are. We must be skeptics here, in regards to these 
supposed adventitious faculties, and if skepticism is to be taken 
seriously, the only reasonable resolution I can conceive is some fonn 
of coherence. 
This will not be an unmitigated and egalitarian coherentism. 
There will be certain beliefs that must enter into the equation, beliefs 
about simple necessary truths and about our experience, a "founda­
tion," ifyou will. 5 Ourpsychological/ epistemic goal here is to reduce 
incoherence, at least enough so that it does not bother us. To contra­
dict the facts that a thing cannot be red and green all over at the same 
time or that I am currently appeared to redly cannot ease any of the 
tension between my beliefs. for these beliefs cannot and should no t 
be gotten rid of. At every tum, necessary truths and truths of 
appearances will force themselves upon us. 
Therefore, my idea of proper assurance can be stated as follows: 
5 has proper assurance of the reliability of c iff: 5 is 
warranted bysome other, previously established cog­
nitive means (c,,) inbelieving that cis reliable, or (1) 5' s 
assessment of c takes into account the purported 
testimony of c, (2) 5's belief in the reliability of cdoes 
not contradict any obvious necessary truths or truths 
of appearances for 5 and (3) 5's experience with 
regard to c has been fairly regular and coherent and 
fits with the informationgiven5by his other faculties. 
The first conjunct above implies only that 5 need not rely upon 
personal experience to test the reliability of the cognitive means in 
question. Provided that 5 is warranted in, say, believing a doctor's 
testimonythathis(S's)hearingisworkingperfectlywell,hewillthen 
have proper assurance of the reliability of his hearing (ifhe did no t 
already). It is also important to note that this is only one possible way 
5 This is to protect us from cases like Plantinga's Epistemically Inflexible 
Climber, who suffers from a cognitive malfunction that inhibits the production of 
new beliefs such that he still (coherently) believes tha twhichwas true several hours 
ago but is now false. Ifwe did not hold that belief in appearances was mandatory. 
our cognitive agent could simply devise coherent but ridiculous belief systems out 
of sheer perversity or a misguided effort to relieve the tension of incoherence. 
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of achieving proper assurance; if it were the only way, proper 
assurance would lie forever beyond our grasp. 
Implicit in this definition of proper assurance is the notion that S 
is aware of the cognitive means that produces or the sustains a 
particular belief. Therefore, victims of the machinations of some 
Cartesian demon (or Plantingan Alpha-Centaurian) would not be 
warranted in the beliefs thus produced, for typically we would think 
that these people do not know that their beliefs are being produced 
in this manner. These people cannot assess the reliability of this 
particular cognitive means (the demon or Alpha-Centaurian), for 
they are not even aware of its existence. 
I feel that my description of proper assurance captures the way 
in which we do assess our faculties. I use the term "assurance" in 
order to imply that this is internal. Thus, my theory is a combination 
of internalism (proper assurance) and externalism (reliability). Just 
as Plantinga causes a great deal of problems for intemalism by 
providing cases in which a person is doing everything right but 
whose cognitive faculties are malfunctioning, so too, I think, have I 
made things more difficult for the pure externalist by suggesting 
adventitious but veridical faculties. Pure internalism seems better 
suited for epistemic obligations than for knowledge, while pure 
externalism seems better suited for consistently true beliefs than for 
know ledge. I hope that this theory can enjoy the better aspects of each 
of the other two. 
There are several consequences of this theory, and I would like to 
take note of a few of them. First of all, in the case of the God-Given 
Brain Lesion, its recipient could never be warranted in the belief that 
this lesion produces. The lesion functions as a perfectly reliable 
faculty, but since itonly produces a single belief there is nothing else 
with which that true belief can cohere. It is difficult to see how she 
could ever gain any assurance of reliability. Also,she could not 
possibly fulfill my criteria as she has no idea why she has the beliefs 
she has. She cannot answer the question, "how do you know that?".6 
With the Part-Time Mind Reader we will see a very different 
case. In this instance our protagonist will not at first be warranted in 
6 As I mentioned in footnote 2, above, the beJiefthat one has a brain lesion couid 
also be produced by other means, means that are warranted. If the victim's doctor 
tells her that she has this lesion, she could, of course. be warranted in that belief, but 
the lesion alone still does not produce warranted belief. 
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beliefs producedby these new anduntested cognitive means. How- . 
ever, with time and experience, he might come to have warrant ifhe 
can recognize (through introspection perhaps) the workings of dis­
crete faculties and can achieve some assurance of the reliability of 
these faculties through the type of coherence mentioned above. Our 
Part-Time Mind Reader can subject himself to experiments, relying 
a great deal on the testimony of others ("You're right! That is exactly 
what I was thinking!"), or the coherence of his readings with other 
facts, perhaps one day achieving warrant. 
A consequence ofthis theory is that babies andAdam (ifwecould 
bring him into the world fully rational but without any experience, 
as God and the Early Moderns are wont to do) would not be 
warranted in believing anything, except perhaps truths of appear­
ances and some obvious (to them) necessary truths. Experience is 
necessary for warrant, since it is needed to provide assurance of the 
reliability of our cognitive means. But this seems to work for the 
present theory rather than against it. Babies probably do not know 
anything; even small children, sometimes, close their eyes in the 
hope that something frightening will therefore go away, seemingly 
not fully aware yet of the endurance of external objects. It seems 
plausible that Adam would be like an infant (as far as knowledge is 
concerned) who, lacking only the requisite experience, would grow 
up very quickly in this respect. 
Obviously more work will have to be done to thoroughly flesh 
this theory out. 1 have tried to give a rudimentary approximation of 
warrant and to showwhy it might be initially plausible. It seems that 
this theory, in combining reliabilism with elements of coherentism 
and foundationalism, as well as externalism and internalism, might 
avoid some of the pitfalls of its component theories .. 
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